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Iran has dramatically stepped up covert attempts to buy nuclear equipment over the last six months,often by using Chinese companies as fronts,according to a senior German industrialist.Ralf Wirtz,whose company,Oerlikon Leybold Vacuum,makes pumps that can be used in uranium enrichment centrifuges,said that more than five years after the AQ Khan nuclear smuggling network was exposed by US and British intelligence the black market trade was on the rise again."In the last six months I have seen a considerable increase of procurement attempts which - as we are told by government authorities - are for a nuclear programme," Wirtz told the world's leading nuclear experts gathered yesterday at a Washington conference organised by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.He said Iran was seeking to buy equipment for its nuclear programme using increasingly sophisticated methods. Instead of using trading companies as fronts, Wirtz said Iran had recently placed orders for sensitive equipment through engineering companies that have legitimate uses for it. He gave the example of a recent attempt to buy his company's pumps through a Chinese engineering firm."European government authorities were notified, one of which learned from the Chinese government that the pumps did indeed go to Iran," Wirtz said. "Although they did not learn the exact end user, they believed Iran's centrifuge programme was the likely customer."He said the Iranian use of Chinese companies was a growing trend.Wirtz added that the firm in this case was probably not aware it was being used to further Iran's nuclear programme.However,another Chinese company was charged in a New York court yesterday with knowingly selling missile and nuclear technology to Iran.Li Feng Wei and his company were indicted on 118 counts of fraud and conspiracy to supply Iran with equipment banned under a UN embargo.David Albright,the head of the Institute for Science and International Security,said:"China is a huge hole in the system.It needs help to implement its own controls."Abdul Qadeer Khan,a Pakistani nuclear scientist who helped mastermind that country's covert weapons programme,admitted in 2004 running a smuggling scheme selling technology to rogue regimes.He was freed from house arrest by a Pakistani court in February.Only a handful of the other members of his international network,which supplied enrichment and other nuclear technology to Libya,Iran and North Korea,were ever tried,and none are currently in jail.Wirtz likened the nuclear smuggling network to a chain store."If you close a few stores,if you shut down some affiliates,the remaining ones continue to operate.Even if you close the corporate headquarters,the shops may be able to survive."He said other companies making dual-use equipment were also receiving a growing number of suspect purchase requests, but in many cases,particularly in the US,those companies were not passing the information on to the authorities for fear of investigation and possible prosecution."Whenever I mention suspicious inquiries,there is consent from my colleagues that they also do have such requests for quotation,and that they just file them or put them into the trash bin," he said."Frankly I would also keep my big mouth shut if all I got in return for my good citizenship is problems with national authorities,while criminals like [the AQ Khan network] walk away as free men after a while."
Scope of Activities
Nuclear Technology/
Activity |
Relevance to Nuclear Weapons Program |
Reported Area of Chinese Assistance to Iran |
| Isfahan nuclear complex (1984-) |
Training of Iranian nuclear scientists
General nuclear research
Site of other nuclear activities of concern |
Possible Chinese assistance with construction and operation of the
Isfahan site (mid-1980s)
Chinese training of Isfahan nuclear engineers (1988-1992)
Provision of nuclear technology used at the Isfahan site (see
other entries) |
| Miniature (27 kW) subcritical neutron source
reactor, located at Isfahan site |
General nuclear research and training; no known direct connection
to nuclear weapons program |
Supplied by China to Iran (1990) |
| Heavy water zero-yield training reactor, located as
Isfahan site |
General nuclear research and training; no known direct connection
to nuclear weapons program |
Supplied by China to Iran (1990) |
| Small calutron, located at Isfahan site |
Calutrons can be used to enrich uranium for weapons fuel, but the
IAEA found that the Isfahan calutron was too small to enrich uranium and did not
appear to be part of a weapons program |
Supplied by China to Iran (l987, 1992) |
| 20 MW research reactor, to be located at Isfahan
site |
Possible use for the production of nuclear weapons fuel material
The IAEA found that the 20 megawatt reactor would be too small to
pose a proliferation threat
US experts disagreed, saying the facility could produce 6
kilograms of plutonium per year, enough for one bomb |
China agreed to provide the reactor to Iran (1991), but China
canceled the deal, apparently due to US pressure (1992) |
| HT-6B Tokamak nuclear fusion reactor, located at
Azan University |
No known direct connection to weapons program |
Facility built and tested in cooperation with China (1993) |
| 300 MW pressurized water power reactors (PWR) (2),
to be located in southern Iran |
Reactors and associated technology could be used to produce fuel
rods, which can be used to make fissile material for weapons |
China agreed to provide the first reactor to Iran (1992-1993), but
negotiations stalled and the deal was eventually frozen in 1995, apparently due
to some combination of technical and financial difficulties, disagreements over
the final site, and US pressure
China promised in October 1997 to cancel the reactor deal and all
future nuclear cooperation with Iran in exchange for the implementation of the
US-China nuclear cooperation agreement |
| Uranium hexaflouride (UF6) conversion plant, to be
located at Fasa
(Possibly two plants - one to convert ore into gas, another to
convert gas back into metal. The second plant may be located in Shiraz.) |
Conversion of milled uranium ore into UF6 gas is a key step in the
uranium enrichment process; after the ore is converted into gas, the gas can be
converted back into metal and shaped into bomb cores
Considered an especially likely signal that Iran is pursuing a
weapons program, since enriched uranium for civilian reactors can be purchased
on the international market at a lower cost |
In 1994, China agreed to supply Iran with the UF6 plant
The deal lapsed temporarily under US pressure in 1995 and was
finally canceled after the October 1997 summit. The cancellation of the project
facilitated the US nonproliferation certifications which were necessary for the
US-China nuclear cooperation agreement to be implemented
The CIA verified the cancellation of this project in a July 1998
report to Congress |
| Calutron, located at Karaj |
Could be used to enrich uranium for weapons fuel |
Supplied by China to Iran (1992) |
| Assistance at other stages of the nuclear fuel
cycle, including:
--Uranium mining
--Uranium milling
--Fuel fabrication |
Development of indigenous fuel cycle facilities enhances Iran's
ability to indigenously produce weapons-grade nuclear material
Many of these activities also have civilian or commercial
applications |
China has reportedly provided technical assistance to Iran in all
these areas |
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